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What is a fair wage? 
Reference points, Entitlements and Gift Exchange 
 
 
 
Eleonora Bottino, Cintia Goddio and Praveen Kujal1 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Society adopts institutions that can change incentives, reference points and 
entitlements for the economic agents. In this paper we look at two stylized wage setting 
institutions and their effect on wage offers and effort in the classic gift exchange experiments 
of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993). The first one is the exogenously imposed minimum 
wage institution (first instituted in New Zealand in 1894). The second institution we look is 
an endogenous wage proposal institution where workers first make wage proposals. We find 
that the imposition of an exogenous minimum wage floor at the competitive outcome lowers 
average wage offers. However, workers do not negatively reciprocate and continue to offer 
high effort. In the second institution workers make non-binding (endogenous) minimum wage 
proposals. The introduction of endogenous minimum wage proposals marginally increases 
wage offers while, average effort decreases when wage proposals are not matched. Finally, 
relative to the baseline, overall efficiency with the non-binding minimum wage decreases, 
while, efficiency is only slightly higher under endogenous minimum wage proposals. We find 
that clear evidence that the institutional structure has important implications towards wage 
offers, effort and efficiency. 
 
JEL Codes: J2, J3.
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: Kujal, p.kujal@mdx.ac.uk, tel: +442084112369. 
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1 Introduction2 
Private contracts are an intimate part of the fabric of exchange and are relied upon for the 
consummation of various economic transactions. Such contracts emerge endogenously, 
require little monitoring and (for this reason) are the preferred vehicle for economic 
transactions. However, when such interactions don’t function as perceived then society 
imposes institutions (through legislation) to supposedly “correct the wrong”. Examples of 
such instances are the renewed financial legislation after the recent crisis, laws that ensure 
enforcement of contracts, labor market legislation, etc. It is clear that behind the imposition of 
these institutions is the perception that society can undo the wrong, or at the least mitigate it 
to some extent. 
Freeman (2008), for example, recognizes that wage-setting institutions can affect 
economic performance in three ways: they “alter incentives” and hence the actions of the 
participating agents, they “facilitate efficient bargaining,” and they “increase information, 
communication, and trust”. However, we know from the experimental literature that the 
imposition of these institutions can also alter reference points, or entitlements, for the 
economic agents and alter behavior in subsequent periods (see for example the literature on 
price and quantity controls3). 
 The imposition of these institutions is, however, not neutral towards the actions of the 
agents (that form the institution) nor towards the outcomes. One can expect that a change in 
rules that govern an institution will change the incentives for the market participants and 
hence their actions. It is in this light the experimental approach is very useful in that one can 
clearly study how changes in institutional rules alter agent actions. For example, Falk et al. 
(2006) show that the imposition of a non-binding minimum wage can change reference points 
                                                 
2 We would like to acknowledge financial support from grant 2012/00103/001 from the Spanish Ministry of 
Education. Comments from Natalia Jimenez, David Porter and especially Pablo Brañas, and seminar participants 
at SEET-2013 and Middlesex University are appreciated. 
 
3 See for example, Isaac and Plott (1981), Coursey, and Smith (1983), Kujal (1994) among others. 
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both for workers and firms. They find that the imposition of a non-binding minimum wage 
changes reservation wages which results in a rise in subjects’ reservation wages that persists 
even after the minimum wage has been removed. This is a clear example of how seemingly 
neutral events can change reference points and hence outcomes. 
 The imposition of the minimum wage legislation was motivated by the 
perception that markets on their own do not provide “fair” compensation towards the lower 
end of the wage strata. Interestingly, this contrasts with the experimental results of Fehr et al. 
(1993) where they find support for the fair wage hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982) in a free market 
setting. They observe reciprocity in employer-employee relationships where fair wage offers 
are reciprocated with higher effort and vice versa. The interesting question to thus ask is 
regarding the effect of imposing such legislation on the mutual reciprocity. 
In this paper we look at how the imposition of labor market institutions impact wages 
and worker effort, and subsequently market efficiency. The imposition of an institution (or 
rules) may create reference points or a sense of entitlement for employers and workers alike. 
Given this we look at simplified versions of two wage setting institutions. The first one, 
exogenously imposed, is the minimum wage institution. The minimum wage legislation was 
first enacted in New Zealand in 1894 and its primary goal was to ensure “fair” compensation 
to workers4. Since then, minimum wage laws have been widely enacted across the world5. 
There is much debate among economists on the benefits and the drawbacks of the 
introduction of a minimum wage6. It is widely accepted that this institution, which is 
supposed to ensure a reasonable wage to low skill workers, is ultimately motivated by 
fairness concerns. 
                                                 
4 Its intention was to guarantee a “minimum standard of living to workers”. 
5 Almost all countries in the top ten ranking of the Heritage Foundation 2009 Index of Economic Freedom report 
have minimum wage laws keeping in mind fairness concerns. 
6 There is evidence that institutions reduce inequality, however, how institutions affect aggregate economic 
outcomes is not clear (Freeman, 2008). 
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The second institution we look at is an institution that tries to capture a structure 
where workers propose a minimum acceptable wage. Under this institution the minimum 
wage proposal is endogenously determined, however, it is not binding on the employers. 
Workers make individual wage proposals and then the average of all proposals is presented to 
the employers as the “wage proposal”. This institution reflects a scenario where workers 
collectively make a one-time wage proposal to the employers. We chose this institution over a 
wage bargaining institution with repeated offers due to its simplicity and that it reflects an 
essential feature of wage bargaining institutions where (initial) endogenous wage proposals 
come from workers. We feel that making wage proposals should give a sense of entitlement 
(to that wage) to workers.  
Exogenously imposed minimum wage or an endogenous minimum wage proposal 
should have different impact on labor markets. The minimum wage may provide a reference 
point to employers while the endogenous wage proposal may result in expectations of 
entitlement to that wage for the workers. 
Given this we study the effect of imposing an exogenous, and endogenous, minimum 
wage institution in a gift exchange environment. We are interested in studying how the 
imposition of the minimum wage institution impacts private fairness in the Fehr et al. (1993) 
gift exchange experiment. We first replicate the findings in Fehr et al. and then study the 
effect of exogenously imposing the minimum wage institution on average wage. We find 
support for the crowding out of private fairness with average wage offers declining across all 
periods. Interestingly a higher proportion of the wage offers are made around the minimum 
wage. The exogenously imposed minimum wage partially crowds out fairness concerns in 
employer-employee relationship. Interestingly, even though wage offers decline, effort levels 
do not. Wage-effort reciprocity is thus also crowded out.  
5 
 
In the endogenous wage proposals institutions workers make a non-binding minimum 
wage proposal. We find that average wage offers increase, however, effort levels decrease. 
Endogenous wage proposals crowd out worker reciprocity when wage proposals are not met 
by employers. If proposed wage offers are not met, workers reciprocate negatively decreasing 
effort levels. 
Similar to Falk et al (2006) we also show that institutions can change reference points 
for workers and the firms. We provide an interesting extension to the standard competitive 
model in the sense that the standard model generally assumes that only the level of payoffs 
matters. However, it might be that the gains are indeed evaluated relative to a reference point 
or worker expectations7. Therefore, if people have reference-dependent fairness preferences, 
policy measures may affect these points relative to which workers evaluate the fairness of 
their employment situation8. The exogenous, as well as the endogenous, introduction of a 
minimum wage in a competitive market may thus change the reference point according to 
which employers, or employee, judge an offer as fair or unfair. For the same reason, the 
introduction of a minimum wage may affect the wages offered by the employers and, 
ultimately, the employees' decisions about the effort levels. 
Literature review: 
Some papers have looked at how exogenously, or endogenously, determined wages affect 
worker performance in the work environment. The closest to ours is (Falk, Fehr and Zehnder, 
2006). They study the effect of imposing a non-binding minimum wage on worker 
preferences and its impact on entitlements. They elicit reservation wages from workers using 
the strategy method. Any wage offer above (below) the reservation wage is automatically 
accepted (rejected). They show that the imposition of a non-binding minimum wage affects 
people´s reservation wage. The temporary introduction of a minimum wage leads to a rise in 
                                                 
7 As in Falk et al. (2006). 
8 Falk et al (2006) make a similar point with regard to worker entitlements. 
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subjects’ reservation wages which persists even after the minimum wage has been removed. 
They do not analyze the effect over the effort of the workers but over their reservation wage. 
Their findings suggest that the cause of the change in the reservation wage is the change in 
the perception of what is considered to be a fair wage. They argue that public policies can 
affect behavior not only through changing behavior but by also shaping perceptions of 
entitlements and thus, reservation values (p 1351). As in their paper we also show that 
institutional arrangements can also shape wage expectations (entitlements) and hence effort. 
Brandts and Charness (2004), study the impact on gift exchange of both, the 
competitive imbalance (both, an excess of supply (workers) and an excess of demand 
(employers)). They assert that although there is a lot of evidence about the gift-exchange 
phenomenon, however, the motivation behind its occurrence is lacking. They introduce a 
binding minimum wage to obtain an excess supply of workers and find that gift exchange is 
not altered with different conditions in the competitive imbalance. However, the effort 
provision declines when a binding minimum wage is introduced. The introduction of a 
binding minimum wage seems to lower effort provision at all wages and also decreases the 
probability of a high wage is offer. 
Another set of papers has looked at how control (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) or 
endogenizing decisions (Charness et al, 2012) can impact worker performance. Falk et al. 
(2006) look at how exogenously imposed performance targets can be counter-productive and 
affect employee performance. In their setup an outside imposition of effort level is construed 
as in indication of distrust and is negatively reciprocated. Charness et al. (2012), meanwhile, 
study the effect of delegating the wage decision to employees on employee performance. 
Delegating the wage decision implies that wages are endogenously determined in their 
structure. They find that delegation significantly increases employee effort with performance 
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increasing for the same wage levels. Finally, earnings of both employers and employees 
increase under this setup. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
We are interested in studying how the introduction of the minimum wage institution, 
exogenous and endogenous, alters reference points or entitlements in labor markets. The 
externally imposed minimum wage provides a reference point for employers while the 
endogenously chosen wage proposal provides an entitlement wage to workers. Our 
experimental design consists of three treatments, the Baseline treatment (BASE, henceforth), 
the Exogenous Minimum Price treatment (EXO, henceforth) and the Endogenous Minimum 
Price treatment (ENDO, henceforth). The BASE is the free market setting as in Fehr et al 
(1993). In the second set of experiments we introduce an exogenous non binding minimum 
wage set at the competitive market wage9. A competitive minimum wage is a reasonable 
place to start as, a priori10, the imposition of a minimum wage at that level should not affect 
wage-effort outcomes11. We conjecture that the exogenously imposed competitive minimum 
wage will provide reference points to employers pushing the average wage downwards. 
In the third set of experiments we introduce a non-binding endogenous minimum 
wage proposal from the employees. We feel that making minimum wage proposals gives 
workers an entitlement to what they consider as a fair wage. In this treatment each employee 
is asked to make a minimum acceptable wage offer and then the average of all the offers is 
taken to be the “initial wage proposal”. The minimum acceptable wage proposal is non-
binding and in theory this should not affect wage offers, or effort levels, from workers. We 
conjecture that a minimum wage proposal will create entitlements for workers on what they 
                                                 
9 The minimum wage is introduced at the competitive level. 
10 The experimental evidence on price (wages) and quantity controls suggests to the contrary (Isaac and Plott 
(1981), Smith and Williams (1981), Coursey and Smith (1984), Kujal (1994), Falk et al (2004)). 
11 We, however, know from earlier experimental literature that this is not the case. Even non-binding price, or 
quantity, levels impact agent behavior. 
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perceive as a fair wage and if not reciprocated may induce negative reciprocity with workers 
responding with lower effort levels. It would be interesting to see whether fairness and 
reciprocity concerns hold when minimum wage proposals come from the workers and are not 
exogenously imposed, and how it may alter their perception of what is a fair wage. 
Our design follows Fehr et al (1993) and the game has two stages. The first stage is a 
one-sided oral auction in which employers and workers exchange one unit of labor time. 
Employers act as bidders: they propose a wage12 and do not have the opportunity to choose 
the worker. Meanwhile, employees act as sellers. If the worker accepts the offer, the contract 
is concluded. If it is not accepted, the employer can change the bid in an additional round 
with the new one being higher than the previous highest unaccepted bid. The first stage lasts 
three minutes. If some traders cannot conclude a contract, they earn zero profits in this period. 
In the second stage, workers determine the value of the good for the buyers choosing 
an effort level anonymously (their choice is revealed only to their employer to eliminate 
group pressure effects) and without any constraint (there are no sanctions associated with the 
effort chosen). As in Fehr et al (1993) we run four sessions for the BASE and EXO treatment. 
We ran five sessions in the ENDO treatment in order to have enough data for different levels 
of minimum wage proposed. Finally, each session has twelve periods. 
In all sessions there are more workers than firms (nine workers and six firms or 
employers)13. The excess supply of workers is to give the competitive theory its best shot. 
Either party does not know the identity of their trading partners. This avoids any reputation 
effects. Further, no labor market terms are used, employers are called buyers, workers are 
called sellers, the wage is called a price and the effort level is called the quality level. Each 
                                                 
12 It has to be multiple of five in order not to put a commission fee. It enables workers to earn a small amount of 
money at marginal trades. 
13 Unfortunately, two subjects did not show up for the third session of the BASE and, for the fourth session of 
the EXO treatments. We had eight workers and five firms in these sessions. Further, in the third and fourth 
sessions of the ENDO treatment there were eight workers and six firms. 
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participant knew how profits are computed and were given sufficient time to read the 
instructions carefully and to ask questions. 
The experiments lasted for two hours including the instructions14. All subjects were 
(randomly selected) volunteer15 students recruited by e-mail and participate for the first time 
in such an experiment (each agent could only participate in one session). Before the 
beginning of a session, each subject had to draw a card that determined if she will be a seller 
or a buyer. Workers and employers were in separate rooms. In each room the supervisor 
transmitted the bids, acceptances and effort messages using Google chat to the experimenter 
in the other room16. 
Subjects were paid a 3 euro show up fees in addition to the profits they earned during 
the experiment. Experimental Money (EM) was used for the purpose of the experiment with 
an exchange rate of 45 units of EM to 1 Euro. All workers are identical and the payoff of a 
worker j is: 
uj = pj - c - m(ej),                                                               (1) 
Where, p is the wage, e is the effort level provided by the worker, c = 26 (constant) is the 
monetary cost of providing one unit of labor time and, m(e) is the monetary effort cost. The 
payoff of an employer i is: 
πi = (v - pi)ei,                                                                         (2) 
Where v = 126 is a valuation given exogenously. The assumption that effort interacts with 
price in the payoff of the employers had been made to avoid losses and analyze only fairness 
concerns. The monetary effort cost schedule is given by the following table (it is the same for 
all workers): 
Table I: Monetary Effort Cost Schedule 
                                                 
14 Appendix A. 
15 ORSEE was used for subject recruiting. 
16 This is very similar to Fehr et al (1993) where wage proposals are made using telephones. 
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e 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
m(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
Utilities, payoff functions of the firms, cost efforts and the values of all parameters are public 
information in both treatments. 
Note that since the Fair Labor Standards Act was passed in 1938, the minimum wage 
has been fixed at about 50% of the observed average wage (closer to 55% in the 1950s and 
1960s, 40% in the 1990s)17,18. In our BASE treatment the observed average wage is equal to 
59.95. Following this rule the minimum wage in the EXO should be equal to 29.98. This is 
very close to our choice of the minimum wage at the competitive level of 30. 
 
Prediction with Money-Maximizing Agents 
Money-maximizing agents have no incentives to choose an effort level higher than the 
minimum one as effort is costly and workers cannot be punished for providing low effort. If 
firms assume that agents are money-maximizers they do not have incentives to offer wages 
above the equilibrium wage level. With parameters values of, v = 126 and c = 26 one should 
expect that wages converge to the competitive equilibrium level of 30. Note that if some 
workers receive a wage level > 30 then some traders are involuntary rationed. 
 
The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis 
Hypotheses 1 to 3 are the same as in Fehr et al. (1993).  
HYPOTHESIS 1: The effort level is increasing in the wage. 
                                                 
17 Minimum Wages, Employment, and the Distribution of Income. Charles Brown. Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Volume 3, edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Chapter 32. University of Michigan and NBER.  
18 Minimum Wage Laws: Are They Overrated? Charles Brown. Journal of Economic Perspectives- Volume 2, 
Number 3- Summer 1988-Pages 133-145. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2: Average wages are considerably higher than the market-clearing wage. If 
the game is repeated the wages do not converge to the market wage. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The average effort is above the minimum one and if the game is repeated 
it does not converge to the minimum one. 
 
We add two additional hypotheses resulting from our minimum wage treatments. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: If the introduction of a minimum wage provides a reference point to 
employers it should lower wage offers. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: If final accepted wage offer is lower than the initial wage proposal then 
effort is negatively impacted. 
Our first basic analysis of the data is the same as the one in Fehr et al. (1993). The 
OLS regression to test the First Hypothesis is19: 
e = α+ βp + μ,                                      (3) 
Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected if β is significantly greater than zero. In the experiment 
agents do not know the effort levels chosen by their partners, as a result they cannot adjust 
their individual notion of fairness to a common market level. To take into account the 
possibility of agents having different ideas of what is a fair response to a wage offer a dummy 
variable di is introduced for workers and we fit the following regression: 
e = ∑i γi di + βp + μ,                                   (4) 
Following this we test if all estimated γi are equal to the estimated α of the first 
regression to analyze for the significance of behavioral differences among workers. We also 
test if effort varies systematically between periods using a period dummy pt and running the 
following regression: 
                                                 
19 All regressions to test the fifth hypotheses are estimated with OLS. We also ran two sided censored Tobit 
regressions to take into account the ceiling in the possible values the dependent variable can assume. The results 
do not differ. Tobit regressions are available upon request. We also do a non parametric test to test the equality 
in populations (Kruskall Wallis equality of population rank test). Our results are robust to these tests. 
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e = ∑tθt pt + βp + μ,                                           (5) 
Again, we test with linear restrictions if there are significant differences between all 
estimated θt and the original estimated α of the first regression. To test the Second and the 
Third Hypotheses we look an Average Relative Overpayment (as defined in Fehr et al., 
1993): 
r = (p0 - c - τ)/(v - c)                                                (6) 
Where, τ = 30 – c and p0 is the average wage in the period. If Hypothesis 2 is true, r should 
be greater than zero and should not converge to zero. 
To test the Fourth and Fifth Hypotheses we perform t tests to compare the Average 
Wage, the Average Effort Level, the Average Relative Overpayment and the Average 
Efficiency of the two treatments. If Hypotheses 4 and 5 are true, the difference in mean of the 
Average Wage and the Average Effort Level should be significant. 
 Finally to test hypothesis 5 we will run the following regression. 
ei=+ di+(ai-pi) +i                                      (7) 
Where, ei is the effort for agent i, di is a dummy which take value 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the 
individual offer, ai, is greater than pi (what agents finally accept). The second term, (ai-pi), 
captures whether the individual offer is above or below the final accepted wage offer. The last 
term is the cross product between the second and third term in the regression. The idea behind 
regression (7) is that if agents take their wage proposals as an implicit entitlement then any 
accepted offer under this reference point should impact effort negatively. 
Finally (as in Fehr et al.) we analyze efficiency. When two participants conclude a 
transaction (there is a match between firm i and worker j), the sum of their gains is defined as: 
Gij = πi + uj = (v - pi)ej + pi  - c - m(ej).                               (8) 
Standard theory predicts the minimum effort and a wage equal to τ + c, therefore, with 
the values of the parameters chosen in Fehr et al. (1993) the joint benefits are: 
13 
 
Gs = (v - c - τ ) emin + τ = 0.1 * 96 + 4 = 13.6                              (9) 
Note that Gs is lower than the maximum Gij that can be achieved: i.e. there is a 
conflict between individual and joint benefits. If fairness considerations exist then this 
discrepancy may be decreased. We use fij as a measure of efficiency of a transaction between 
firm i and worker j. 
fij = Gij/Gs,                                                                                     (10) 
Standard theory predicts a fij = 1 but the highest possible value of fij is 7.29 when p = 125. 
Therefore fij assumes values between 1 and 7.29. 
 
3. Main Results 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics. 
Henceforth we will refer to prices as wages, sellers as workers, buyers as employers 
and quality level as effort level. In the BASE and the EXO treatments 275 wages were 
accepted out of 276 wage offers meanwhile, 359 wages were accepted out of 360 (wage 
offers) in the ENDO treatment. The lowest observed wage was 2520 in the BASE, 30 in the 
EXO and 1021 in the ENDO experiments. Interestingly, the proportion of wage offers at the 
competitive level (the non-binding minimum wage) is much higher in the EXO and ENDO 
than in the BASE experiments. In the EXO and ENDO treatments, 17% and 14% of the offers 
are observed at the competitive wage of 30, respectively; while only 5% of them are observed 
in the BASE experiments. Finally, the highest wage is 95 in the BASE and 120 both, in the 
EXO and ENDO treatments. 
                                                 
20 This was observed once in the first period of the first session, another in the last period of the second session 
and another in the tenth period of the third session. Even though these prices give negative benefits to the sellers 
they accepted them. 
21 This was observed once in the fifth period of the second session. It is worth noting that in the ENDO there 
were also offers of 15, 20 and 25 that even though those wages give negative benefits for the sellers, they 
accepted them. 
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Even though there are more workers than firms, lowest wage offers were sometimes 
rejected by the workers forcing the employers to increase their wage offer22. We also observe 
that when a firm improves upon a rejected offer the worker chooses a lower conversion rate 
to punish the firm for her earlier low offer. 
The overall average wage offer in all sessions of each treatment was 59.95, 54.37 and 
65.84 in the BASE,EXO and ENDO23 treatments respectively. The average wage offer in the 
minimum wage treatment (EXO) is significantly lower (p=0.00002)24 than observed in the 
baseline experiments (BASE). Our results clearly show that the introduction of a minimum 
wage shifts offers downwards. This result suggests that exogenously imposed institutions that 
provide reference points can crowd out private fairness. Interestingly, the opposite happens 
when an endogenous minimum wage is introduced, i.e. the average wage in the ENDO 
treatment is significantly higher than what is observed in the BASE (p=0.0004) experiments. 
Endogenous wage proposals seem to have a positive effect on the average wage offer. 
Looking at effort one finds that the average effort chosen by the workers is 0.27, 0.28 
and 0.22 in the, BASE, EXO and ENDO experiments, respectively. These levels are almost 
three times as high as predicted by the money maximizing theory. Further, even though 
wages are lower in the EXO treatment, the average effort is not significantly affected. The 
difference in means across the BASE and EXO experiments in the average effort level is not 
statistically significant (t-test: p=0.6811). More surprising are the results in the ENDO 
treatment where the average wage offer is significantly higher than in BASE and the average 
effort is significantly lower (t-test: p=0.0033). One explanation for this may be that workers 
may develop a perception of entitlements while making wage proposals. Subsequently, if the 
wage proposals (or worker expectations) are not matched, workers may respond by lowering 
                                                 
22 In all treatments, one offer of thirty was not accepted. In those periods where the wage is not accepted this 
firm does not participate in the market, therefore only five transactions were concluded. 
23 The wage offers we obtain are lower than observed in Fehr et al. who obtain an average wage offer of 72. 
24 It is also confirmed by a Kruskal Wallis test. Results available on request. 
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effort25. Interestingly, we observe that the effort level decreases as the difference between the 
wage proposal and the wage offer increases (see figure III). 
It is interesting that the imposition of an exogenously imposed minimum wage and an 
endogenous wage proposal has opposing effects. The competitive minimum wage provides a 
reference point to the employers’ that negatively affects wage offers meanwhile, effort levels 
are maintained. The effect of endogenous wage proposals is negative on worker effort levels, 
however, average wage increases. As earlier mentioned effort levels may decrease as the 
workers feel entitled to the wage proposals and upon not getting them negatively reciprocate 
by lowering effort levels. It is, however, not clear why average wage offers increase under 
endogenous wage proposals, and don´t go down in response to lower effort levels. It is 
possible that, as in the EXO treatment, employers try to elicit higher effort through higher 
wage signals. 
Figure I: Cumulative Distribution Function. BASE versus EXO and ENDO 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 We check for this later on. 
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Looking at the wage frequency distribution for the three treatments (figure I) we can 
see that in the EXO treatment, 38.41 % of the final offers are between 30 and 45, 22.84% in 
the ENDO treatment, while only 19.50% of them are in this interval in the BASE. Both the 
EXO and ENDO treatment result in leftward shift of the distribution of wage offers. Though, 
the shift is greater for the exogenously imposed minimum wage institution. 
The introduction of an exogenously imposed competitive minimum wage decreases 
wage offers. It seems that the imposition of the exogenous minimum wage institution alters 
the reference point of wage offers towards the minimum wage resulting in lower wage offers. 
As a result, higher effort levels are not reciprocated with higher wages. We observe the 
opposite in the ENDO treatment, that is, high wage offers are not reciprocated with high 
effort. These results are interesting, as they point out that higher wages in the BASE treatment 
with respect to the EXO were not being offered purely due to reciprocity concerns. If 
reciprocity concerns were important than the imposition of the minimum wage should not 
have altered wage offers as they should have reciprocated to high effort. 
We now look at the observed average and median effort levels of workers for given 
wage intervals. There is a general increasing trend in both average and median effort with 
wages in all the treatments (see Figure II). However, the average (and median) effort levels in 
the endogenous wage treatment are lower than in the BASE and EXO treatments (as 
mentioned before, the difference in means across the BASE and EXO experiments in the 
average effort level is not statistically significant (t-test: p=0.6811). However, the average 
effort is significantly lower in the ENDO compared with the BASE (t-test: p=0.0033). We 
summarize our first main result below. 
 
Result 1: The effort level is increasing in wage for all treatments (BASE, EXO and ENDO). 
We fail to reject Hypothesis 1. 
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Given that the wage effort relation varies across treatments we further analyze the data 
for possible structural breaks as wages increase. Looking at structural breaks helps entangle 
differences in wage-effort relation for the high and low wage-effort groups. We do this by 
pooling the data of the four sessions together for each treatment and then dividing the data in 
the corresponding wage-effort pairs for wages lower, and higher, than 60. These intervals are 
chosen as a great proportion of wage offers26 are between 30 and 90. 
Figure II: Average Effort – Wage Relation 
 
 
Table II: Results of the regression e = α+βp+μ 
 N α p(α) SD(α) β p(β) SD(β) R2 
BASE Low Wage 
level 
144 0.019 0.756 0.062 0.004 0.002*** 0.001 0.067 
BASE High Wage 
level 
131 0.190 0.331 0.197 0.002 0.468 0.003 0.004 
EXO Low Wage level 188 0.037 0.507 0.056 0.004 0.000*** 0.001 0.067 
EXO High Wage level 87 0.039 0.836 0.189 0.005 0.033** 0.003 0.052 
ENDO Low Wage 
level 
170 0.005 0.922 0.466 0.004 0.000*** 0.001 0.077 
ENDO High Wage 
level 
189 0.103 0.297 0.098 0.002 0.074 0.001 0.017 
                                                 
26 Except for a few outliers at 25 or 100. 
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One can see in table II that the β-coefficient in the BASE treatment is statistically 
different from zero only for lower wages but not for higher ones. This is interesting as it tells 
us that the effort level is responsive to wage increase only at lower levels. The relationship, 
however, does not hold for higher wage levels. We obtain a similar result in the ENDO 
treatment where β-coefficient is statistically different from zero only for lowest wages but not 
for the highest ones. This is, however, not the case in the EXO treatment where the β-
coefficient is statistically different from zero for both groups of wages suggesting a positive 
relation at both low and high wage levels. Our results suggest that reciprocal behavior may 
not be prevalent across all wage-effort levels. It seems that increase in wages from lower 
levels are reciprocated, however, wage (effort) increases at higher levels are not equally 
reciprocated. We observe this behavior in the BASE and the ENDO treatments, and the not in 
the EXO treatment. 
To further understand the wage effort relationship we now analyze the behavior of 
average effort and average wage across periods in the three treatments. In figure III we can 
see that wage offers start at similar levels in all the treatments. However, in the EXO 
treatment they decline till the fourth period and then stabilize again. From the fourth period 
onwards, the average wage in the EXO treatment is always smaller than in the control 
although, it is still significantly above the minimum wage. Looking at the wage offers in the 
EXO treatment one notices that the wage starts declining once one buyer chooses the 
minimum wage. This then triggers similar offers from other subjects. It seems that most 
buyers are reluctant to be the first movers but, are eager followers. In the case of the ENDO 
treatment we observe that there is an increasing gap between the minimum wage proposals 
and the wage offers. The wage offers decline as the minimum wage proposals increase. The 
wage proposals have an effect upon wage offers that goes in the opposite direction. In all 
treatments average wages are significantly above the minimum wage of 30. 
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Result 2: Average wages are considerably higher than the market-clearing wage. 
Furthermore, wages do not converge to the market wage for the duration of the experiment. 
We fail to reject Hypothesis 2. 
 
Figure III: Evolution of Average Effort Levels 
 
 
 
 
Now, we look at the average effort (Figure IV) chosen over time. While, the behaviour 
of average effort is similar across all three treatments there is a difference of trends across 
treatments. Relative to the BASE experiments there is a strong negative trend both in the 
EXO and ENDO treatment. In figure IV one can clearly see that the average effort is above 
the minimum level and does not converge to it in the repeated game. We can see that average 
effort is above 0.1 in all periods. 
Pooling data from all sessions in the BASE treatment we find that the evolution of the 
Average Effort Level presents a (statistically) significant trend at 10% significance level 
(p=0.0574). There is, however, a statistically significant negative trend at 5% (p=0.008) in 
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the EXO treatment. Moreover, the first half of the trend is greater than the overall trend 
(statistically significant at 10%: p=0.081). A similar result is obtained in the ENDO, i.e. there 
is a statistically significant negative trend (p=0.0005) and the first half of the trend is greater 
than the overall trend (statistically significant at 5%: p=0.03). This again confirms that effort 
levels increase by a greater proportion for lower wage levels. 
 
Figure IV: Evolution of Average Effort Levels 
 
 
We can thus conclude that even though the minimum wage does not decrease the 
average effort level for the BASE and EXO treatments. However, the imposition of the 
minimum wage creates a negative trend in the evolution of the reciprocity of workers. This 
effect is of a greater magnitude in the short run. Interestingly, the effect is stronger in the 
ENDO experiments. In addition to a negative trend; a reduction in the average effort level 
(with respect to BASE) is also observed. These results show that fairness concerns are being 
crowded out as the experiment progresses in both the EXO and ENDO treatments. 
Hypothesis 3 is supported for the BASE experiments, but not for the EXO or ENDO 
treatments. We summarize these results below. 
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Result 3:The average effort is above the minimum effort level and does not converge to the 
minimum effort in the repeated game in the BASE treatment. 
 
Finally we analyze the Average Relative Overpayment (ARO). Defined as r = (p0-c-τ)/(v-c), 
ARO represents the percentage of surplus employers give to their workers. According to the 
Money-Maximizing Agents Theory this should be zero as there is an excess supply of 
workers in the market. Note that if ARO is lower in the minimum wage treatment this 
signifies crowding out of private fairness. As observed for effort levels, ARO declines across 
both the BASE and the EXO treatments.  It is 0.302 in the BASE and 0.246 in the EXO 
treatment27. The difference of ARO across the two treatments is also statistically significant 
(p=0.008). Comparing across treatments we find that ARO is 0.302 in the BASE experiments 
while, it is 0.359 in the ENDO experiments. The difference is statistically significant at the 
1% confidence level (p=0.003)28. These results show that under the endogenous wage 
proposal institution employers, on average, share a higher proportion of the surplus than 
under the BASE or EXO experiments. 
 
3.2. Regression Analysis 
We now explore our results in detail. To investigate whether the effort level is increasing in 
wage29 (Hypothesis 1) we run an OLS and a Tobit regression with the effort level (wage) 
being the dependent (independent) variable. We obtain similar results for both estimations 
and thus only report the OLS regressions. One can see the results of the first regression in 
Table III for the BASE, EXO and ENDO treatments. 
One can see (Table III) that the β-coefficient in the regression for Hypothesis 1 is 
positive and significant in all of the regressions30. This tells us that the effort level depends 
                                                 
27 Fehr et al. (1993) obtain an ARO of 0.42. 
28 We shed more light on this later where we look at the evolution of ARO across the experimental periods. 
29 We use the same approach as in Fehr et al. (2006). 
30 Except in the regression for the last period in the BASE and EXO treatments. 
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positively on wages. These results are along the line of the main result in Fehr et al. (1993). 
Further note that the introduction of the minimum wage decreases the standard deviation (SD) 
of wages in almost all the regressions31. This is along the line of the results in the empirical 
literature where they show that the imposition of wage institutions decreases wage dispersion. 
In our case we observe this as the imposition of the minimum wage institution lowers wage 
offers from above. 
Table III: Results of the regression e = α+βp+μ32 
 N α p(α) SD(α) β p(β) SD(β) R2 
 BASE Treatment 
S1-4 275 -0.0040 0.9338 0.0479 0.0046 0.0000*** 0.0008 0.1132 
SL1-4 23 0.0465 0.6147 0.0910 0.0021 0.1578 0.0014 0.0927 
S1 72 0.0403 0.4128 0.0489 0.0025 0.0070*** 0.0009 0.0994 
S2 72 0.0063 0.9534 0.1082 0.0040 0.0220** 0.0017 0.0727 
S3 59 0.0575 0.5891 0.1059 0.0055 0.0020*** 0.0017 0.1549 
S4 72 0.0313 0.8009 0.1236 0.0039 0.0367** 0.0019 0.0608 
 EXO Treatment 
S1-4 275 0.0299 0.4312 0.0379 0.0046 0.0000*** 0.0007 0.1464 
SL1-4 23 0.1384 0.1028 0.0811 0.0005 0.7235 0.0015 0.0061 
S1 72 0.0876 0.2081 0.0689 0.0037 0.0124** 0.0015 0.0861 
S2 71 -0.0609 0.3824 0.0693 0.0059 0.0000*** 0.0012 0.2509 
S3 72 -0.0663 0.4480 0.0868 0.0051 0.0003*** 0.0014 0.1684 
S4 60 0.0688 0.5074 0.1031 0.0051 0.0047*** 0.0017 0.1299 
 ENDO Treatment 
S1-5 359 0.0423 0.1435 0.0288 0.0028 0.0000*** 0.0004 0.1130 
SL1-5 30 -0.0068 0.9089 0.0586 0.0030 0.0036*** 0.0009 0.2650 
S1 72 0.1358 0.2380 0.1141 0.0017 0.3197 0.0018 0.0141 
S2 72 0.0520 0.4247 0.0648 0.0024 0.0074*** 0.0009 0.0980 
S3 72 -0.0245 0.5338 0.0392 0.0038 0.0000*** 0.0006 0.3480 
S4 71 -0.0209 0.7470 0.0647 0.0041 0.0000*** 0.0009 0.2523 
S5 72 0.1142 0.0113 0.0439 0.0011 0.0714* 0.0006 0.0457 
 
As in Fehr et al (1993) we run a regression with a dummy variable for each agent. 
This is done to take into account the possibility of differences in notions of fairness between 
agents. In our experiments agents do not have the possibility of knowing the effort level 
                                                 
31 The SD does not decrease in the regression of the last periods in the BASE and in the first session regressions' 
of the BASE and the EXO. 
32 S#: Session #; SL1-4: Results of the estimation with the last period data of all sessions; N: Number of 
observations; p(): p-value of the relevant coefficients; SD(): Standard Deviation of the relevant coefficients; R2: 
Adjusted coefficient of determination. 
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chosen by their partners, as a result none of them can adjust their notion of fairness to a 
common market level. We find that the intercept is significantly different among agents, 
meaning that the notion of fairness differs among individuals. This is obtained for all 
treatments. 
Now, it is possible that the effort level of the agents varies systematically across 
periods. As in Fehr et al (1993) we introduce a period dummy pt. We confirm the result (Fehr 
et al.), that the behavior according to the effort level between periods is not significantly 
different in the BASE. This, however, is not the case in the EXO and ENDO treatments 
where we find that the effort level systematically varies across periods. This could be due to 
the fact buyers adjust slowly to the minimum wage announcement. Once the first offer is 
made at the minimum wage others follow suit. In the ENDO treatment the reason is different, 
as the wage proposal is updated every few periods agents adjust their effort level given that 
and the wage offers they receive. It could be due to this that we observe differences in effort 
levels across periods both in the EXO and in the ENDO treatments. 
We now look at the evolution of the Average Relative Overpayment per period 
(Figure V). Recall that this is the proportion of the surplus given to workers33. We find that 
the Average Relative Overpayment is (statistically) significantly greater than zero in all 
treatments34. 
Analyzing all sessions together ARO has no statistically significant negative trend 
neither in the BASE nor in the ENDO treatments (p=0.338 and p=0.094 respectively). The 
opposite happens in the EXO treatment where there is a negative trend and, moreover, it is 
greater in the first half of the treatment (p=0.005). This suggests that employers share a 
smaller proportion of the surplus with the workers as the experiment progresses when the 
                                                 
33 The theoretical prediction is that they should get zero. 
34 BASE vs EXO (p value=0.008), BASE vs ENDO (p value=0.008), EXO vs ENDO (p value=0.000). 
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minimum wage is imposed exogenously. This clearly implies that the minimum wage 
treatment affects income distribution negatively. 
The introduction of the non-binding minimum wage significantly reduces the Average 
Relative Overpayment. The Average Relative Overpayment is 0.3023 in the BASE and 
0.2463 in the EXO experiments and is statistically significant at the 10% level (p=0.008). 
This further lends support to the assertion that the minimum wage institution crowds out 
private fairness. Even though effort levels do not decline, average relative overpayment is 
significantly lower in the EXO treatment. On the other hand, the effect is just the opposite 
with the introduction of the endogenous minimum wage. In the ENDO treatment ARO is 
greater than in the BASE (ARO in ENDO = 0.3586) and this difference is statistically 
significant (p=0.003). 
 
Figure V: Evolution of the Average Relative Overpayment across periods 
 
 
Now, we analyze whether the introduction of the non-binding exogenous minimum 
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between treatments. We find that the introduction of a non binding minimum wage makes 
firms significantly reduce wage offers (p=0.00). As explained before, the opposite happens in 
the ENDO treatment where agents use the minimum price as a signal to induce firms to offer 
greater wages which results in a higher average wage offer(p=0.00). 
Result 4: The introduction of the non-binding exogenous minimum wage reduces average 
wage offers in the EXO treatment. Meanwhile, average wage offers are greater in the ENDO 
treatment. Hypothesis 4 is partially supported by our data. 
Even though average wage offers decline average effort is not significantly affected 
when we compare the BASE with the EXO treatment. Even though the average wage offer 
increases in the ENDO treatment with respect to the BASE, average effort is reduced. Our 
results thus reject Hypothesis 5 that states that effort levels should also decline if average 
wage declines. The Average Effort Level is 0.27 in the BASE and 0.28 in the EXO 
experiments. Though this difference is not statistically significant, the increase in average 
effort as average wage declines suggests workers use higher effort levels as a signaling device 
to obtain higher wages35. Contrarily, in the ENDO it seems that agents respond with smaller 
effort levels when firms do not offer wages in the line with their wage proposal. It seems that 
the presence of a non-binding wage proposal institution instills expectations of entitlements 
among employees. When they are not met, workers respond by lowering effort. This is an 
example of negative reciprocity in the case when worker expectations are not realized. 
Result 5: Average effort does not decline with the decrease in wages in the EXO treatment. 
Average effort levels across the BASE and EXO treatments are not significantly different. 
However, average effort declines in the ENDO treatment. Hypothesis 5 is not supported by 
our data. 
                                                 
35 Some subjects asked us this question during the experiment. 
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Finally, we run the regression in equation (7) (ei=+ di+(ai-pi)+i). This regression 
also provides one of the more interesting results in our paper. Here we check for the relation 
between effort levels (ei) and the difference between the wage proposals (ai) and the final 
accepted offer (pi) in the ENDO treatment. This regression allows us to see whether negative 
effort is due to the fact workers wage expectations are not fulfilled. Our results are presented 
in table-IV below. Where both coefficients  and are negative (-0.05198 and -0.00402) 
and significant at 10 and 5%, respectively (p-value, 0.0816 and 0.0457).This result shows that 
effort is negatively related with wage expectations. Making a wage proposal seems to give 
workers wage entitlements and when not reciprocated are negatively reciprocated through 
lower effort levels. 
 Table IV: ENDO Treatment 
Results of the regression ei=+ di+(ai-pi) +i 
Variable Coefficient SD t statistic p-value 
 0.354 0.0249 14.205 0.000 
 -0.0415 0.02653 -1.566 0.1179 
 -0.0025 0.00033 -7.377 0.0000*** 
 
Situations like the one studied above are not rare. Worker involvement in the 
management process is common. Workers sit in the boardrooms as representatives and make 
proposals towards firm functioning. Our result is interesting as it points out that in situations 
where wage proposals are made, the proposer feels entitled to the proposed wage and upon 
not getting it responds negatively by expending less effort. It is clear that the perception of 
entitlements in this sense impacts incentives and efficiency of the system. 
Finally, we present another interesting result on the effect on efficiency. Stigler (1946) 
commented that the introduction of minimum wage will result in resource misallocation36. 
                                                 
36 Stigler, 1946, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation. American Economic Review 36: 358-365. 
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We find that total efficiency decreases in the EXO treatment where, average efficiency37fij is 
3.28, while it is 3.60 in the BASE treatment. The difference between both treatments is 
statistically significant (p=0.003). The reduction in efficiency (as well as the one in the wages 
offered and the relative overpayment) is another of the negative consequences of the 
introduction of the exogenous fairness based institution. The opposite happens in the ENDO 
treatment. Compared with the BASE, average efficiency increases; now it is 3.74, even 
though, this difference with the BASE is not statistically significant (p=0.25). We can 
conclude that the introduction of the endogenous minimum wage increase the average wage 
offer and the Relative Overpayment. It also marginally increases efficiency even though the 
increment is not significant.  
 
4. Conclusion: 
Labor markets across the world have different institutional arrangements regarding 
wage bargaining, working hours, overtime payment etc. that can importantly impact 
outcomes. One such example is the minimum wage legislation that was first enacted, and 
later emulated in several developed countries, with a similar argument. Most wage setting 
institutions are imposed keeping fairness concerns in mind. Meanwhile, other wage setting 
institutions are set to give the workers some say in the wage setting process. 
In this paper we first experimentally study the effect of the minimum wage 
(exogenously and endogenously determined) in a gift exchange experiment. We first 
successfully replicate the results of Fehr et al (1993) where private fairness concerns 
effectively prevent wages from decreasing to the market-clearing level: firms take into 
account that the effort level of workers depends on wages when they make their wage offers 
and higher wages are reciprocated with high effort. We then introduce a non-binding 
                                                 
37 Recall that the standard theory predicts a level of efficiency equal to 1. 
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minimum wage at the competitive wage. We find that average wage levels are lower than in 
the control experiments. However, average effort levels do not decline correspondingly. It 
seems that even though private fairness is crowded out, i.e. lower wage offers are obtained; 
workers still offer higher effort levels. The distribution of wages offered shifts to the left, with 
a substantial proportion of the offers (38.41%) near the minimum wage levels. 
We find that the minimum wage institution crowds out private fairness resulting in 
lower wage offers. Further, average relative overpayment and the efficiency gains that 
fairness creates are also diminished. Finally, it also creates a negative trend in the evolution of 
effort levels workers reciprocate firms with. It seems that effort is also negatively affected in 
the long run. 
We further run experiments looking at a simplified version of a wage proposal 
institution where workers make an average wage proposal to the firms. Such an institution 
reflects the various wage bargaining institutions where both sides of a sector negotiate wage 
increases or minimum wage levels. We find that this institution has several interesting 
properties. It seems that allowing the workers to propose a minimum acceptable wage results 
in certain expectations regarding wage which, when not met, result in lower effort (negative 
reciprocity). Average wage offers increase in this framework and are above the (free market) 
control experiments. Surprisingly, the higher wage levels result in negative reciprocity when 
wage offers do not coincide with average wage proposals. It seems that it is not only the wage 
level but also the wage expectation that plays a role. In this sense, and in spite of the higher 
average wage, the endogenous minimum wage crowds out positive reciprocity. 
Our experiments show that one can study different institutional arrangements in an 
experimental setup and study how they impact outcomes. It would be interesting to see how 
institutional structures alter the well known gift exchange result under different institutional 
arrangements. We are already working on some of these extensions. 
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